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I.

INTRODUCTION.

Drake's Statement of the Case suggests that "[t]his case involves the
unfortunate and all too common scenario of beneficiaries fighting over the assets
of a trust." Drake's Brief at 3. That simply is not true. What this case involves is
the responsibility of an attorney who represents a trust to render proper legal
services that meet the controlling standard of care.
Drake downplays the fact that Diane Nolen, while acting as a Co-Trustee
with her elderly mother, plundered the Trust. When Trust beneficiaries asked for
an accounting, Drake advised the Trustee (and all trust beneficiaries) that an
accounting was only required for the period of time commencing after the other
Co-Trustee died, even though Nolen was a Trustee at the time she plundered the
@,

Trust, and even though the Trust document requires an accounting "on demand" to
the oldest trust beneficiary. Drake now asserts that there was nothing deficient
about his advice-which essentially concluded that a co-trustee can plunder a trust,
notwithstanding the fiduciary duties owed to trust beneficiaries, then simply
account for only the monies that were not plundered. Drake cites no compelling
authority for his position, which is directly contrary to both the controlling
language of the Trust documents and the basic principles underlying the duties of a
fiduciary.

5 294608v 1 ( 65011.1)
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Drake further downplays the fact that he advised Nolen she did not have a
conflict of interest in using Trust funds to litigate her right to keep an asset out of
the Trust, and Drake actively represented (at Trust expense) Nolen's right to keep
the asset out of the Trust. Drake ignored Nolen's conflict, as well as his own in
simultaneously representing the Trust, while also assisting someone who was
trying to keep an asset out of the Trust.
In sum, what this case is about is not beneficiaries fighting over assets, but
about a lawyer's refusal to take any responsibility for providing demonstrably
deficient advice that resulted in significant cost and damage to the Trust and to
Trust beneficiaries.
II.

RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR ANY OF THE TRUSTEE'S
CLAIMS AGAINST DRAKE.

Just a few months after Stagg Eldercare Services, Inc. (the independent
Trustee appointed by the court in the Nolen litigation) commenced this litigation,
Drake filed a motion to dismiss which asserted that the Trustee's claims were
barred by res judicata. R. 71-73. The trial court granted that motion in part,
holding that a prior suit brought against Nolen and Drake by some of the
beneficiaries of the Trust-but not by the Trustee (the Nolen Lawsuit) barred all of
the Trustee's claims "regarding the Oxford/Santa Fe, LTD partnership interest (the
'Partnership Interest') and any issues that flow from it." R. 413-14.
2
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It is undisputed that the trial court's res judicata ruling cannot be upheld
unless each of the following elements is met: (1) Kara Cattani as Trustee "was a
party to or in privity with a party to" the Nolen Lawsuit; (2) "the issue decided in
the [Nolen Lawsuit] was identical to the one presented in the instant action"; and
(3) the Nolen Lawsuit "resulted in a final judgment on the merits." See Drake's
Brief at 34 (quoting Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42,
123, 285 P.3d 1157). However, none of these elements is met, and the trial court's
dismissal based on res judicata must be reversed.
A.

~

The Trustee Was Never a Party (or in Privity with a Party) to the
Claims Against Drake in the Nolen Lawsuit.

The trial court erred in applying res judicata because the Plaintiff in this
case-Trustee Stagg and now the successor Trustee Kara Cattani in her capacity as
Trustee of the Trust (and not in her individual capacity)-was neither a party in the
prior Nolen Lawsuit nor in privity with a party in the Nolen Lawsuit. In fact, the
court dismissed the claims against Drake in the Nolen Lawsuit precisely because
Drake and his firm had represented only the "Trust and its Trustee" and "had never
represented the Plaintiffs" in the Nolen Lawsuit (who were Trust beneficiaries).
R. 135-36. The court further explained that "attorneys retained by the trustee of a
trust owe their duties and loyalty to the trust" and "such duties do not run to the
trust beneficiaries." Id.

3
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Thus, while the plaintiffs in the Nolen Lawsuit were Trust beneficiaries, the
Plaintiff in the current litigation is the Trustee (who the court in the Nolen Lawsuit
said was the proper party to assert claims against Drake). The court in the Nolen
Lawsuit never addressed the merits of the Trustee's claims; it merely held that the
beneficiaries were not the proper party to assert those claims because (unlike the
"Trust and its Trustee") they did not have an attorney-client relationship with
Drake.
In an improper effort to uphold the trial court's erroneous res judicata ruling,
Drake mislabels and mischaracterizes the parties in this case and the prior Nolen
~

Lawsuit. Drake repeatedly refers to the Plaintiff in this case as "the Cattanis." For
example, he asserts that "[t]he Cattanis contend that the district court erroneously
applied issue preclusion ...." Drake's Brief at 35. But "the Cattanis" make no
contentions of any kind in this suit because they are not parties in this suit. There
is only one Plaintiff in this suit: the current Trustee of the Trust. The beneficiaries
of the Trust who were the Plaintiffs in the prior Nolen Lawsuit are the ones whom
Drake labels as "the Cattanis," but they are not parties here.
Similarly, Drake emphasizes the fact that beginning in May 2009, Stagg (the
independent Trustee appointed by the court in the Nolen Lawsuit) became the sole
plaintiff in the Nolen Lawsuit, and thus the Trustees (either Kara Cattani or her
predecessor, Stagg) were Plaintiffs in both this case and the Nolen Lawsuit.
4
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Drake's Brief at 35. But it is undisputed that the Trustee's involvement in the
Nolen Lawsuit did not occur until after all of the Trust beneficiaries' claims
against Drake had already been dismissed, and only claims against Nolen
remained. See Drake's Brief at 12. Furthermore, one of the express conditions in
the stipulation permitting Stagg to become the Plaintiff in the Nolen Lawsuit was
that Stagg would "not attempt to assert or re-assert . . . any claims against any
parties other than Diane Nolen, including Defendants Lyle Drake and/or his law
firm." R. 3343. Thus, none of the Trustee's claims against Drake on behalf of the
Trust, which are the claims at issue here, were ever asserted by anyone in the
Nolen Lawsuit.
Finally, Drake disingenuously insists that the Plaintiff here and one of the
plaintiffs in the Nolen Lawsuit are the identical person, Kara Cattani. Drake's
Brief at 36. But it is beyond dispute that Kara Cattani (along with the other Trust
beneficiaries/plaintiffs) asserted her own claims in her individual capacity in the
Nolen Lawsuit, and she is the Plaintiff in this litigation solely in her capacity as the
current Trustee of the Trust. This litigation was filed by Stagg, the independent
Trustee who stepped in after the court in the Nolen Lawsuit removed Nolen as

Trustee. Once the Nolen Lawsuit ended and Nolen disclaimed any further interest
in the Trust, there was no longer a need for a professional fiduciary to act as
Trustee, and Kara Cattani, the person designated by Florence Oates to be the
5
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Ill

successor Trustee, replaced Stagg. In any event, the law is well settled that "[a]
party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not
thereby bound by . . . the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he
appears in another capacity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 36(2)
(1982). Even the trial court refused to accept Drake's same-plaintiff argument,
acknowledging the distinction between "the beneficiaries who were plaintiffs in
[the Nolen Lawsuit] and the Trustee who is Plaintiff in this case." R. 414. Thus,
the Plaintiff in this litigation (the current Trustee) was not a party to the claims
against Drake in the prior Nolen Lawsuit.
The trial court nevertheless erroneously held that these distinct plaintiffs had
"sufficient privity between" them to warrant application of res judicata. R. 414.
But that holding completely ignores this Court's teaching that "privity depends
mostly [on the parties'] relationship to the subject matter of the litigation." Hansen
v. Bank of New York Mellon, 2013 UT App 132, ,I7, 303 P.3d 1025, 1027. Here,

the Trustee and the trust beneficiaries have vastly different relationships to the
claims asserted against Drake in the Nolen Lawsuit. Indeed, the court in the Nolen
Lawsuit dismissed the Trust beneficiaries' claims against Drake specifically
because the court found that only the Trustee could assert those claims because
only the Trustee had the attorney-client relationship with Drake. Thus, it makes no
sense, after the court in the Nolen Lawsuit dismissed the claims because they had
6
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to be brought by the Trustee, to now hold that the prior dismissal is res judicata as
to the Trustee.
Drake baldly asserts that Kara Cattani's participation in the Nolen Lawsuit
in her individual capacity, and her participation here in her representative capacity
as Trustee of the Trust is a "distinction without a difference" because she now
seeks to recover damages ultimately suffered by the trust beneficiaries. Drake's
Brief at 36. But it is always true that claims asserted by a trustee are ultimately for
the benefit of the trust and the trust's beneficiaries on whose behalf the trustee
serves; that is the very definition of what a "trustee" does. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007) (trustee required to act "solely in the interests of
the beneficiaries" of the trust); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 36(2) (1982).
The important point here is that this is not a situation in which Kara Cattani
litigated in her individual capacity and lost a claim in the Nolen Lawsuit, and is
now trying to re-litigate that same claim in her representative capacity. Instead, the
court in the Nolen Lawsuit held that the Trustee, and not the Trust beneficiaries,
had the attorney-client relationship with Drake, and therefore only the Trustee
could assert attorney malpractice claims against Drake.

The Trustee's claims

against Drake, which are now the focus of this case, were not asserted in the Nolen

7
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Lawsuit-and therefore have never been decided and cannot possibly be barred by
res judicata.
B.

The Issues Decided in the Nolen Lawsuit Are Not Identical to the
Issues Presented in this Case.

Drake admits that res judicata can apply only if the issues decided in the
Nolen Lawsuit are identical to the issues presented in this case. However, he does
not even attempt to dispute that three of the four issues in this case related to the
Oxford/Santa Fe partnership interest were never presented or decided in the Nolen
Lawsuit. Compare four issue listed in Opening Brief at 26-27, with Drake's Brief
at 39-41.

Accordingly, there is no dispute that the issues in this case are not

identical with those decided in the Nolen Lawsuit, and the trial court erred in
applying res judicata.
As to the fourth issue, which Drake argues was decided on the merits in the
Nolen Lawsuit-whether Nolen acquired the partnership interest through undue
influence-Drake is wrong. The court in the Nolen Lawsuit granted summary
judgment for Nolen on the portion of the Trust beneficiaries' undue influence
claim which related to the partnership interest because that claim belonged to the
Estate of Florence Oates, not because that claim had no merit if brought by the
proper plaintiff. The court's ruling on the undue influence claim in the Nolen
Lawsuit was as follows:
8
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The real party in interest for such a claim is the
Estate of Florence Oates and not the beneficiaries of the
Trust. The Court grants the Motion for Summary
Judgment on this cause of action as to the Partnership
Interest but denies the Motion on the claims relating the
[sic] supposed taking of assets from the trust from 2002
and thereafter.
R. 161. Thus, the court in the Nolen Lawsuit did not determine that there was no
undue influence; it determined only that the Trust beneficiaries were not the proper
plaintiffs to pursue such a claim. Indeed, the court in the Nolen Lawsuit later
allowed Stagg (which the court had appointed as Trustee after removing Nolen) to
substitute as plaintiff in the Nolen Lawsuit to pursue certain claims, including
specifically "Undue influence by Diane Nolen against Florence Oates by allegedly
effectuating the transfer of property . . . including the 10% limited partnership
~

interest in Oxford/Santa Fe .... " R. 2666-2730 (Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Revise Ruling on Motion to Dismiss at Ex. C (Stipulation and Joint
Motion to Permit Amendment and Substitute Party Plaintiff in Nolen Lawsuit)).
And the undue influence claim against Nolen was one of the claims settled when
Nolen agreed to return assets to the Trust. 1

1

Drake's contention that the Trustee's trial counsel admitted that the court in the
Nolen Lawsuit had ruled on the merits of the undue influence claim is incorrect.
See Drake's Brief at 40. First, Drake's quotation of trial counsel's statement is
unfairly incomplete. When the trial court read only a portion of the prior court's
ruling on the undue influence claim and asked trial counsel whether the prior court
"took it out of the picture," trial counsel responded, "He did ultimately, yes," but
then immediately qualified that response with uncertainty when he added (but
9
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Thus, the claims in this litigation are not identical to the claims decided in
the Nolen Lawsuit. Accordingly, for this additional reason the trial court erred in
dismissing claims against Drake based on res judicata.

C.

The Nolen Lawsuit Did Not Result in a Final Judgment.

The trial court also erred in applying res judicata because the Nolen Lawsuit
did not result in a final judgment on the merits.
Drake first contends that the Trustee waived this argument because she
addressed it only in a footnote, and (according to Drake) "a footnote is not
sufficient to preserve an argument for review." Drake's Brief at 34, n.2 (citing
Jacob v. Cross, 2012 UT App 190, 12, 283 P.3d 539). But Drake's contention is
both factually and legally mistaken.

The Trustee's assertion that the Nolen

Lawsuit did not result in a final judgment is not limited to a footnote in her
Opening Brief. Instead, she also asserted in the main text of her brief that for res
judicata to apply "the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits," and that this element of res judicata is "missing in this case." Opening
Brief at 22-23.

Drake fails to include): "It sounds like, yeah." R. 2420. Furthermore, Drake fails
to mention that trial counsel later explained how the trial court had misconstrued
the prior ruling in the Nolen Lawsuit when he asked the court to revise its ruling on
the Motion to Dismiss. R. 2654-57.
10
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But, even if the Trustee had addressed this point solely in a footnote (which
is not true), that would not have waived this argument. The case on which Drake
relies, Jacob, supra, does not support Drake's position that this Court should
ignore all arguments made in footnotes. Instead, this Court simply held in Jacob
that an appellate court may decline to consider an argument "[i]f an appellant fails
to adequately brief an issue" by discussing the relevant facts and providing citation
to authorities. Jacob, 2012 UT App. 190,

,r 2.

Here, the Trustee supported her

argument with facts and citation to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(f)(2) (2014) and

Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966. Thus, the Trustee
has not waived this argument.
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(f) as it existed at the time the Nolen
Lawsuit concluded in 2011, a decision by a district court could become final, and
the time for filing an appeal would begin, only after one of three events occurs:
( 1) the court approves an order submitted with an initial
memorandum; (2) the court enters an order prepared by
counsel and served on opposing counsel pursuant to rule
7(f)(2); or (3) the court explicitly directs that no
additional order is necessary.

Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. King, 2013 UT 13, ,I15, 297 P.3d 619;
see also Giusti, 2009 UT 2, ,I,I 27-32. None of these things occurred in the Nolen
Lawsuit. Instead, the last action in that case was the court's unsigned minute entry.

See Docket for Case No. 060502429.
11
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Accordingly, there is no final judgment in the Nolen Lawsuit, and the time
to appeal that court's decision has still never started. Thus, the trial court erred in
dismissing the Trustee's claims based on res judicata.
D.

The Claims Related to the Oxford/Santa Fe Partnership Were Not
Decided on their Merits.

Finally, Drake erroneously argues that, even if the trial court erred in
dismissing the claims related to the Oxford/Santa Fe partnership interest based on
res judicata, this Court should nevertheless affirm that dismissal because the trial
court also correctly ruled that these claims failed on their merits under the
judgmental immunity defense. Drake's Brief at 41-43. That argument is plainly
wrong.
Drake does not cite to the portion of the record where the trial court
supposedly decided these issues on the merits, because it does not exist. The trial
court never reached the merits of these claims. Instead, it dismissed the Trustee's
claims related to the partnership interest on res judicata grounds on August 13,
2012-long before the trial court decided the remaining claims on the merits when
it granted Drake's motion for summary judgment in 2014. R. 412-16; see also
R. 2737-39. The trial court never reached the merits of the claims related to the
partnership interest (including whether they are barred by the judgmental immunity
defense) because the trial court had already erroneously dismissed these claims

12
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based on res judicata. Indeed, the trial court insisted that claims related to the
partnership interest "will not be relitigated in this case." R. 414 ( emphasis added).
Accordingly, Drake's attempt to rescue the trial court's erroneous resjudicata ruling by relying on a supposed determination based on the merits that
never happened is baseless and must be rejected.

Gil

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
JUDGMENT FOR DRAKE.

IN

GRANTING

SUMMARY

Drake's arguments in support of the trial court's reasons for granting
summary judgment on the Trustee's negligence claims and claims for breach of
fiduciary duties have no merit. Similarly, Drake's additional arguments on which
the trial court did not rely have no merit. Thus, the trial court's grant of summary
~

judgment should be reversed.
A.

The Law and Disputed Facts Preclude Summary Judgment on the
Negligence Claims Against Drake.
1.

Drake's advice that Nolen could ignore Irene Cattani's request
for an accounting fell below the standard of care.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (the Trustee),
the facts in this case demonstrate that: ( 1) Nolen served as Co-Trustee of the Trust
with Florence from 1999 until Florence died in 2005; (2) upon Florence's death,
Nolen continued serving as a Trustee, now as the sole Trustee of the Trust, until
the court in the Nolen Lawsuit replaced her with Stagg in 2008; (3) in January
13
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2006, Kent Cattani, in his capacity as Irene Cattani' s guardian, began requesting an
accounting from Nolen; (4) at the time of these requests, Irene Cattani was the
oldest adult beneficiary of the Trust; and (5) Drake advised Nolen that she was not
required to provide the accounting that Irene Cattani requested. Indeed, not only
are these facts supported by evidence, Drake does not dispute any of them.
Drake nevertheless argues that the trial court properly held that Drake's
advice regarding the duty to provide an accounting did not fall below the standard

ti

of care because either Drake's advice was "perfectly consistent" with the
controlling terms of the Trust and therefore "correct," or even if not correct it was
"reasonable attorney judgment." Drake's Brief at 23-26. Drake is wrong as a
matter of law on both points.
First, Drake's advice that Nolen was not required to comply with Irene
Cattani's request was not, as a matter of law, correct.

Section VII of the

Declaration of Trust provides: "Accounting shall be made only to the oldest adult
beneficiary of any trust hereunder at such time as said beneficiary shall demand."

ti)

R. 1631. Irene Cattani was the "oldest adult beneficiary" when Kent Cattani began
demanding an accounting on her behalf in 2006, and therefore Nolen was
'ii
unequivocally required, as a matter of law, to provide the requested accounting at
that time.

14
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Attempting to escape that inescapable conclusion, Drake relies on another
provision of the Trust, § VI: "Any successor Trustee hereunder shall be liable and
responsible only for such assets as are actually delivered to him, without obligation
to make accounting for all assets originally in the hands of a predecessor Trustee."
R. 1630. Drake erroneously contends § VI applies here because Nolen "was a
successor trustee" and all of the Trust assets "were in the hands of Florence, the
predecessor trustee, until Florence's death." Drake's Brief at 24.
But Drake's characterization of the facts is plainly wrong (or, at the very
least, fails to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, as
they must be). From 1999 to 2005, Nolen was not merely a "successor Trustee" to
Florence; instead, Nolen was a Co-Trustee with Florence. All the assets in the
Trust as of 1999, and continuing until Florence's death in 2005, were not solely "in
the hands of Florence;" instead, they were jointly in the hands of Florence and
Nolen, as Co-Trustees. Thus, as applied to these facts, § VI means only that Nolen
was not required to account for Trust assets that existed prior to 1999, but which
were no longer in the Trust when she began her fiduciary duties as Co-Trustee in
1999. That provision cannot reasonably be read to support the notion that, when
the oldest adult beneficiary of the Trust demanded an accounting from Nolen in
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2006, Nolen could withhold all the information about the Trust during her service
as Co-Trustee from 1999 to 2005. 2
Accordingly, as a matter of law, Drake's advice that Nolen was not required
to provide the accounting Irene Cattani requested in 2006 was clearly wrong. Not
surprisingly, the court in the Nolen Lawsuit ordered that the accounting be
provided. R. 161. Thus, Drake's advice fell below the standard of care, and the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Drake.
Second, Drake's alternative argument-that even if his advice was incorrect,
he is nevertheless protected by the judgmental immunity doctrine-is also wrong.
To fit within that doctrine, Drake's advice must at least be debatable. See Watkiss
& Saperstein v. Williams, 931 P.2d 840, 846 (Utah 1996). Here, § VII of the

Declaration of Trust unambiguously required Nolen to provide the accounting
Irene Cattani requested, and § VI expressly addresses predecessor and successor
trustee situations; not co-trustees as in this case.
Drake contends that the judgmental immunity doctrine applies because the
Trustee cannot cite any authority to show that Nolen had a well-settled duty to
2

Drake also emphasizes the fact that, until her death in December 2005, Florence
was the oldest adult beneficiary of the Trust and therefore the only person entitled
to request an accounting under§ VII of the Declaration of Trust. Drake's Brief at
24. But that fact does not mean that, when Irene Cattani became the oldest adult
beneficiary in 2006, the accounting she was entitled to demand was limited to just
the period she held the position of being the oldest. Instead, a Trustee is obligated
to give an accounting of the entire period of his or her service as trustee, whenever
the oldest adult beneficiary demands. R. 1630-31.
16
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provide the accounting Irene Cattani requested. Drake's Brief at 25. 3 But the
controlling authority (as Drake himself contends) is the Declaration of Trust
provisions discussed above. See Drake's Brief at 25 (contending that Utah's Trust
Code provisions are "pre-empted by the express terms in Section VI and VII of the
Trust"). Thus, if the terms of the Trust control, there is no need for the Trustee to
cite to any authority beyond the Trust provisions on which the Trustee properly
Gj

relies.
Drake's final attempt to show that his erroneous advice to Nolen about the
accounting was reasonable and protected by the judgmental immunity doctrine is
to point to the opinion of the Trustee's expert witness. Drake's Brief at 25. But
Drake's argument mischaracterizes the expert's opinion, and it is immaterial in any
event.

Consistent with the controlling Trust provisions discussed above, the

Trustee's expert unequivocally opined that "after Florence's death, Ms. Nolen had
a duty to account for transactions that occurred prior to Florence's death." R. 970.
The expert also stated that "the extent of that duty is not entirely clear," meaning
that it is not clear what such an accounting would consist of or how detailed it
would have to be, but the duty to account for the period in which she served as a
Co-Trustee prior to Florence's death was unqualified. Id.
3

Drake actually contends that "the Cattanis" cannot cite to such authority, but as
discussed above, the Cattanis are not plaintiffs in this litigation, and Drake
employs this misnomer as an improper rhetorical device to bolster his erroneous
res judicata argument.
17
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Drake's reliance on an expert witness's opinion is misplaced in any event.
Whether Drake's erroneous advice about the accounting was a reasonable
interpretation of the unambiguous Trust provisions is a legal issue for this Court to
decide. Thus, this Court owes no deference to a trial court's legal determination,
much less the views of an expert witness. See Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v.
Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ,I 9,284 P.3d 630.

In sum, Drake's advice to Nolen about the accounting was incorrect and so
obviously contrary to the controlling Trust provisions that the judgmental
immunity doctrine cannot apply. There is simply no reasonable basis to conclude
that a Trustee with access to Trust funds (and who in fact plunders those funds) has
no duty to account for her conduct as Trustee. Accordingly, the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for Drake must be reversed.
2.

Drake's advice that Nolen had no conflict of interest fell below
the standard of care.

Drake asserts several arguments m support of the trial court's grant of
summary judgment with respect to the Trustee's claim that Drake's advice to
Nolen that she did not have a conflict of interest fell below the standard of care.
Drake's arguments have no merit.
First, Drake falsely accuses the Trustee of arguing that Nolen had a conflict
of interest merely "because she was both a trustee and a beneficiary." Drake's
18
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Brief at 26. The Trustee makes no such argument. Instead, the Trustee contends
that Nolen had a conflict of interest (and Drake's advice that she did not fell below
the standard of care) in three respects: ( 1) it was in the Trust's best interest to
safeguard and preserve its assets for the purposes of the trust, but Nolen misused
Trust funds to misappropriate Trust funds to herself and her attorney to represent
her personal interests; (2) it was in the Trust's best interest to have a transparent
accounting of Nolen's actions as Co-Trustee, but Nolen resisted providing an
accounting to hide her unauthorized taking of Trust funds; and (3) it was in the
Trust's best interest that the Oxford/Santa Fe partnership interest be included in the
Trust, but Nolen wanted to keep that asset for herself. Conflicts of interest exist in
these three scenarios because Nolen's personal interests and the interests of the
Trust "are 'inconsistent' or 'incompatible."' In re Anna Blackham Aagard Trust,
2014 UT App 269, 339 P.3d 937.

The Trustee does not argue that an

irreconcilable conflict exists anytime someone is both a trustee and a beneficiary of

ti

a trust.
Next, Drake contends that there could be no conflict related to the
Partnership Interest because the court in the Nolen Lawsuit found that that asset
never became part of the Trust. But the court in the Nolen Lawsuit never decided,
one way or the other, whether Nolen exercised undue influence on Florence to
obtain the Partnership Interest, and if Florence had not transferred that asset to
19
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Nolen it would have been part of Florence's estate upon her death and ultimately
flowed into the Trust. Thus, the beneficiaries' undue influence claim related to the
Partnership Interest did create a conflict of interest, and Drake fell below the
standard of care in failing to properly advise Nolen accordingly.
Furthermore, even if were possible to contend that Nolen had no conflict of
interest related to the Partnership Interest, there is clearly no reasoned basis to
fib

contend that there is no conflict of interest for the Trustee to use the Trust's funds
to pursue her personal interest to keep an asset out of the Trust. That is particularly
true when the Trust beneficiaries were forced to pay the expenses to seek to

~

recover the asset on behalf of the Trust.
Finally, Drake contends that he could not breach his duty to advise Nolen of
a conflict related to her refusal to provide the requested accounting because he
allegedly did not know about Nolen's misappropriation of approximately $265,000
"

from the Trust. After the Trust beneficiaries had raised concerns about Nolen's
conduct as a Trustee, there is no possible basis to contend that refusing the
requested accounting benefitted the Trust (or anyone else other than Nolen
personally). Thus, Nolen clearly had a conflict of interest about which Drake
failed to advise her.
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3.

Drake's advice regarding Nolen's use of Trust assets to further
Nolen's personal interests fell below the standard of care.

The trial court also erred in granting summary judgment on the claim that
Drake was negligent in advising Nolen that she could use Trust assets to pay
Maynard to represent her personal interests.

Drake attempts to defend that

decision by first disputing that he gave that advice. But there is no dispute that,
while Drake represented the Trust and Nolen in her capacity as Trustee, Maynard
represented Nolen in her personal capacity. Moreover, Maynard testified in his
deposition that Nolen was "told by counsel from Utah [Drake] that she should pay
me from the trust." R.1540. The dispute between Drake's and Maynard's versions
of what happened, at a minimum, creates a genuine issue of material fact which
cannot be resolved in a motion for summary judgment.
Drake tries to characterize Maynard's testimony as hearsay because
(according to Drake) Maynard is talking "about what Nolen told him about
Drake's advice." Drake's Brief at 31. But Drake's characterization is based on an
unsupported assumption; Maynard did not say that Nolen told him. And if, for
example, Maynard is talking about what he personally heard Drake say, Drake's
out-of-court statement would be an "opposing party's statement" and therefore not
hearsay at all. Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).
Moreover, Maynard's version does not stand alone.

Nolen herself also

testified that Drake told her she could use Trust assets to defend her personal
21
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interests. R. 2987. Again, such a statement, offered against a party opponent, does
not need to fit within any hearsay exception because it is outside the definition of
hearsay in the first place. Utah Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2). Thus, the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment.
The law is clear that, contrary to Drake's advice, Nolen could not use Trust
funds to pay Maynard unless she defended the Nolen Lawsuit "in good faith."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004(2); Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, 221 P.3d
845. In light of the strong evidence that Nolen resisted providing an accounting to
keep concealed her pattern of misappropriation of Trust assets and self-dealing,
there is at the very least an issue of fact as to Nolen's good faith, and therefore as
to the propriety of Drake's advice. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on this claim.
B.

Genuine Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on the Claims
for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Trustee shows that
Drake erroneously took Nolen's side with respect to disputes over the accounting,
conflict of interest and payment of Maynard's fees.

Drake argues that this

evidence does not necessarily mean he was representing Nolen's personal interests
in breach of his fiduciary duties. He contends that his advice may have been "in
the best interests of the Trust and the Trustee"-his clients-and that advice just
22
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happened to benefit Nolen personally. Drake's Brief at 43-44. Thus, the essence
of Drake's argument related to the breach of fiduciary duty claims is that they tum
on his intent.

But a party's intent, like all issues of state of mind, is

quintessentially a question of fact which generally cannot be resolved on summary
judgment as a matter of law. See Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, § 17, 7 P.3d
783.
Gi

More importantly, there is no conceivable basis for suggesting that refusing
a request for an accounting was somehow beneficial to the Trust.

After

beneficiaries raised concerns about the propriety of Nolen's conduct as Trustee,
what possible benefit could there have been in advising the Trustee not to provide
an accounting (particularly when the Trust documents requires that one be
provided) and to instead wait to provide one only after the beneficiaries are forced
to file suit and succeed on that suit? Drake's argument is nonsensical, and the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on the Trustee's breach of fiduciary
duty claims.
C.

The Law and Disputed Facts Preclude Summary Judgment on Drake's
Alternative Arguments.

Finally, Drake contends that the trial court's grant of summary judgment
should be affirmed on two grounds on which the trial court did not rely: (1) the
Trustee was not damaged by Drake's malpractice; and (2) the Trustee cannot assert
23
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malpractice claims against an attorney hired by a predecessor Trustee. Neither
argument has any merit.
1.

Genuine issues of fact as to the Trust's damages preclude
summary judgment.

In the Opening Brief (at 40-41 ), the Trustee presented argument, authority
and citations to the record demonstrating that the Trust had been damaged by
Drake's malpractice. Drake now argues that, even though the trial court did not do
so, it could have granted summary judgment for Drake because there is no
evidence the Trust was damaged by Drake's malpractice. Drake's arguments have
no merit.
The trial court could have granted summary judgment on the damage
element of the Trustee's claims only if there was no evidence at all of any

il

damages caused by Drake's malpractice. Here, this Court need look no further
than the fact that, but for Drake's erroneous advice that Nolen was not required to
provide the accounting Irene Cattani requested, the Trust would not have been
forced to pay attorneys' fees for Drake and Maynard's efforts to talk the
beneficiaries out of seeking an accounting, and then pay Drake and Maynard
additional fees to unsuccessfully defend against the demand for an accounting in
the Nolen Lawsuit. Those fees would have been unnecessary, and simply would
not have been incurred if Drake had properly advised Nolen. Thus, the trial court
24
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could not have granted summary judgment on the damage element of the Trustee's
claims against Drake.
Drake also contends that one of the components of the damages the Trustee
seeks (the reimbursement of the fees the Trust beneficiaries incurred when forcing
Nolen to provide the accounting in the Nolen Lawsuit) fails for lack of causation.
Drake's Brief at 47.

However, this argument fails because "[g]enerally, the

question of proximate cause raises an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury for
its determination." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). "Only in
rare cases may a trial judge rule as a matter of law on the issue of proximate
causation." Steffenson v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P .2d 482, 486 (Utah.
App. 1991 ). This is not one of the "rare cases."
Drake merely contends that "[t]here is no way" he could foresee that a
successor Trustee would reimburse the Trust beneficiaries' fees. But it is clear that
the Trust beneficiaries' legal fees were expended for the benefit of the Trust, and
indeed substantially benefitted the Trust through removal of Nolen and recovery of
substantial Trust assets from Nolen.

Stagg, as an independent Trustee, was

substituted into the litigation against Nolen with the understanding that the
discovery that had already been completed would not be repeated. R. 3340 at ,I 5.
The litigation expenses that had been paid by the Trust Beneficiaries were
expenses that would have been incurred by the independent Trustee had the
25
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independent Trustee been in place from the start, and they resulted in monies being
returned to the Trust by Nolen (considerably more than the cost of the litigation).
Thus, Drake's suggestion that the Trust's reimbursement of those expenses was
somehow untoward is puzzling. In any event, the foreseeability of these damages
must be decided by a jury; not based on Drake's unsupported pronouncement that
"[t]here is no way."
2.

The law allows the current Trustee to assert the Trust's claims
against an attorney hired by the predecessor Trustee.

Finally, Drake argues for the first time that Kara Cattani, as the successor
Trustee, cannot assert malpractice claims against the attorney of the predecessor
Trustee (Nolen). Drake's Brief at 48-49. Because that argument was not raised in
the trial court and is not "apparent on the record," this Court should not consider
Drake's new argument for the first time on appeal. See Francis v. State, 2010 UT
62, 119, 248 P.3d 44 ("we will not affirm a judgment if the alternate ground or
theory is not apparent on the record").
Even if the Court were to consider Drake's new argument, that argument has
no merit. Unlike the cases on which Drake relies, the facts in this case demonstrate
that Drake represented both Nolen and the Trust. For example, Drake's attorneys
have, on Drake's behalf, repeatedly characterized Drake's client as the Trust. See,
e.g., R. 1563 ("Consequently, we believe that an actual or potential conflict of
26
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interest has ansen between Mr. Drake and his client, the Trust."); R. 2122
("Mr. Drake and the Firm adamantly deny that they have ever represented the
beneficiaries of the Trust; the attorney-client relationship has been strictly between
the Trust and the Firm.").
Furthermore, Drake specifically advised Nolen that she could pay his bill
from the Trust's funds. Drake's current assertion that he was only representing
Nolen, with no responsibility to the entity he directed to pay his bill, is unfounded.
This Court should thus reject Drake's assertion that the independent Trustee
brought in because of the malfeasance that Drake helped cover up was somehow
not entitled to step into the previous trustee's shoes and assert the Trust's
malpractice claims against Drake.
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CONCLUSION

The trial court's dismissal of claims based on res judicata and grant of
summary judgment for Drake should be reversed, and this case remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of May, 2016.
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